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Abstract 
 
Consider a world with two people, 1 and 2, where person 1 (the proposer) may 
offer to help person 2 (the responder). The proposer may be altruistic towards the 
responder either out of a genuine desire to make her happy or out of guilt. The 
responder derives disutility from apparent acts of altruism motivated by guilt 
because she considers them to be insincere. She might reject some offers, 
depending on her beliefs about the proposer’s type. I model this social interaction 
as a game with interdependent preference types under incomplete information 
where the responder cares about the intentions behind the proposer’s prosocial 
behavior. I consider two recent formulations of endogenous guilt: simple guilt and 
guilt from blame. These formulations make the social interaction a psychological 
game. I find that the beliefs held by the players can lead to an equilibrium in 
which all offers are sincere and so no mutually beneficial trades are rejected, 
although the responder has incomplete information about the proposer’s type. 
Equilibria with insincere offers are possible under simple guilt but are impossible 
under guilt from blame. These results are applicable to both intrinsic and 
instrumental motivations for sincerity. I also discuss the implications of 
insincerity aversion for co-operation, altruism, political correctness, choice of 
identity, and trust.  
 
 
 
Keywords: guilt, intentions, insincerity, interdependent preference types, prosocial 
behavior, psychological game. 
JEL Classification: C73, J16, Z13. 
 2
“Sincerity makes the very least person to be of more value than the most talented 
hypocrite.” - Charles Spurgeon 
 
 
“To give real service you must add something which cannot be bought or measured 
with money, and that is sincerity and integrity.” - Douglas Adams 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In standard economics and game theory, only actions affect payoffs. Intentions 
are irrelevant. It is the final outcome that matters not the process. But there are clearly 
situations where intentions affect payoffs. The same action might induce different 
payoffs depending on the intentions of the parties or players. Indeed, intentions matter 
in important ways. It is the basis for the legal distinction between murder and 
manslaughter and partly explains the attitudes of certain groups towards racial 
profiling. In the former case, the same action (i.e., taking a person’s life) may attract a 
different punishment depending on whether the action is believed to be premeditated 
or not. In the latter case, a traveler at an airport or a motorist who is searched by the 
police may react differently depending on whether he believes that the search was 
random or was motivated by his race or religion.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the following class of social 
interactions or prosocial behavior. Suppose someone offers to help you but you 
thought the offer might be motivated by guilt than a genuine desire to help, will you 
accept the offer? Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely accepted by 
your peers and “friends”. In particular, suppose you are invited to a party, movie, 
dinner, etc not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel 
guilty if she did not invite you, or you got a job at an elite institution but you wouldn’t 
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have been offered the job if you were not a minority, or someone gives you a present 
because they felt obliged to do so not because they really wanted to give you a 
present? Or a friend is expected to give you a phone call because you need her 
emotional support. If you have a caller ID and you think she is making the call 
reluctantly, will you answer the phone? If your boss, supervisor, or professor tells you 
to feel free to come talk to her anytime you encounter problems in your work, will you 
take her up on that offer, if you thought she was making the offer grudgingly? Does 
one’s enjoyment from sex depend on whether her partner’s intention is a long-term 
relationship or casual relationship? Will the answer affect the decision to accept or 
reject an offer into a sexual relationship? In all of these cases, it is conceivable that the 
intention behind the action will matter and hence will affect your payoffs. The 
intention will matter if the target of the offer is averse to insincerity. 
The average reader may be able to relate to some of these situations from 
personal experience. These examples are common and interesting social interactions 
worthy of study. They are the basis of friendships and relationships at work, school, 
church, and in our daily lives. They determine who we choose to go to lunch with, 
play with, and in general socialize with. They determine the frequency and enjoyment 
of our social interactions. 
 One may assume that there is already some kind of superficial, implicit, or 
lower-level relationship between the two parties. For example, they may work at the 
same place or they may be neighbours. The question is: will the parties necessarily 
engage in mutually beneficial trades in a world where the sincerity of actions matter? 
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In what follows, I refer to the player who offers to help or extends an invitation to a 
social event (e.g., dinner) as the proposer, and the other player as the responder. 
Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) show that intentions can also be modeled as 
stemming from interdependent type preferences. In the social interaction in the present 
paper, the proposer has a one dimensional type space: a social type which captures 
whether he likes the responder’s company or not or whether he is helping the 
responder out of guilt or out of a genuine desire to help. The responder has 
interdependent type preferences because she has preferences over the proposer’s social 
types.1 Knowledge of the proposer’s social type will help the responder determine the 
sincerity of the proposer’s offer and hence determine the intention behind his offer. 
This requires that the responder forms beliefs about the proposer’s social type.  
Psychological game theory pioneered by Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti 
(1989) models intentions as beliefs about beliefs, where players have belief dependent 
preferences. In an important extension, Rabin (1993) applied this framework to study 
intentions-based reciprocity or kindness.2 Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005) extend 
Geanakoplos et al. (1989) to dynamic psychological games where players’ utility 
depend on the beliefs of others and on updated beliefs. Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 
(2000, 2006), Brandts and Sola (2001), Falk et al. (2003), McCabe et al. (2003), and 
                                                 
1 Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) consider more general cases where all players could have 
interdependent type preferences. This makes their model much more difficult to analyze because 
of the potential circularity of the formulation of types. We do not have this problem because the 
proposer does not have interdependent preferences. He does not care about the responder’s type. 
His social preferences are independent of any characteristics of the responder. This makes our 
model much simpler. Similarly, in Kartik and McAfee (2006) only the voters have interdependent 
type preferences. 
2 See Levine (1998) for a model which studies intentions-based reciprocity by using interdependent 
preferences. 
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Offerman (2002) present experimental evidence which support the idea that intentions 
matter in reciprocal relationships.  
This paper has both elements of psychological games and interdependent type 
preferences.3 Both approaches to modeling intentions in games are complementary. 
Indeed, Searle (1969) argues, in a very influential philosophical work, that sincerity is 
linked to a person’s state of mind (i.e., his beliefs).4 So insofar as this paper is 
concerned with the sincerity of a person’s behavior or altruism, psychological game 
theory and/or a model with interdependent type preferences gives an appropriate 
analytical framework. 
I consider endogenous guilt by allowing the proposer’s cost of guilt to depend 
on the responder’s expectation of an offer. In particular, I consider two formulations of 
such endogenous guilt due to Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006): simple guilt and guilt 
from blame. These formulation make the social interaction a dynamic psychological 
game with interdependent preference types. I characterize the equilibria of this social 
interaction.   
I find that the beliefs of both parties play a key role in generating an 
equilibrium with sincere or insincere offers. In particular, the beliefs held by the 
players can lead to an equilibrium in which the responder does not reject mutually 
beneficial trades (i.e., sincere offers), although she has incomplete information about 
                                                 
3 The model is a psychological game due to the specific formulations of endogenous guilt. If guilt were 
exogenous, the model would have been a standard game with interdependent preference types. An earlier 
version of this paper had exogenous guilt. Such a model is not capable of producing results such as 
propositions 1 and 4 and is unable to examine various forms of guilt. More importantly, it does not model 
the source of guilt. 
4 Walker (1978) discusses the limitations of this concept. My formal model has a precise definition 
of sincerity or insincerity and therefore is not subject to philosophical critiques of the definition of 
sincerity. In addition to Walker (1978), see Ridge (2006) for a definition, critical analysis, and 
extension of Searle’s concept of sincerity. 
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the responder’s type. Equilibria with insincere offers are possible under simple guilt 
but are impossible under guilt from blame. I also discuss the implications of 
insincerity aversion for altruism, political correctness, choice of identity, and trust.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly 
discuss the role of guilt and insincerity in social interactions. I also discuss how my 
model differs from Benabou and Tirole (2006a). Section 3 presents a simple model of 
social interaction under incomplete information in a dynamic psychological game and 
characterizes its equilibria. I discuss applications in section 4. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Guilt aversion and insincerity aversion 
 In the social interaction studied, guilt plays an important role. As Baumeister, 
Stillwell, and Heartheron (1994, p. 243) note “… guilt is something that happens 
between people rather than just inside them. That is, guilt is an interpersonal 
phenomenon that is functionally and causally linked to communal relationships 
between people. The origins, functions, and processes of guilt all have important 
interpersonal aspects.” They continue “[T]his is not to deny that some experiences of 
guilt can take place in the privacy of one’s individual psyche, in social isolation. Still, 
many of those instances may be derivative of interpersonal processes and may reflect 
highly socialized individuals…”5 
 Building on a well-known idea in psychology (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994), 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006) introduce the 
term guilt aversion to describe the behavior of people who suffer guilt if they believe 
                                                 
5 See also Tangney (1992). 
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that they have hurt another person because they did not meet that person’s expectation. 
It refers to the disutility felt from disappointing others or letting them down. They 
show how guilt aversion can sustain good or co-operative behavior. 
In a related contribution, Huang (2003) examines how guilt can motivate 
securities professionals' behavior in their fiduciary relationships with their clients and 
the legal implications of guilt for the regulation of securities professionals. In a 
different but related context, Huang and Wu (1994) examine show how remorse can 
lead to better social order. In both papers, the basic notion is that guilt provides an 
internal mechanism beyond the external mechanisms for legal compliance provided by 
private litigation, public enforcement, and formal sanctions. As noted by Huang 
(2003), the ability of guilt to regulate behavior is applicable to any situation that 
involves trust. 
A very important difference in the present paper is that insincere offers, 
motivated by guilt aversion, impose a cost (disutility) on the responder. This 
insincerity-induced disutility or insincerity aversion produces an effect that is absent in 
previous works on guilt aversion (e.g., Huang and Wu, 1994; Dufwenberg,  2002; 
Huang, 2003; and Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). In particular, while guilt aversion 
in these papers can sustain cooperation or good behavior, the likelihood of such 
cooperation may fall because guilt-induced cooperation may be perceived by one party 
as insincere and hence may be rejected because this party dislikes insincere or forced 
cooperation.  
A person may be a sincerity pragmatist where in certain contexts, she may care 
about sincerity but in others, she may not. She may have an instrumental value for 
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sincerity in certain situations but may have an intrinsic value for sincerity in others. 
This kind of cost-benefit calculus by such sincerity pragmatists is alluded to by the 
Nobel laureate, Albert Camus when he opined that “[H]ow can sincerity be a 
condition of friendship? A taste for truth at any cost is a passion which spares 
nothing.”6 In the same vein, Kang (2003a, 2003b) makes a case for insincerity in a 
democracy. He argues that insincerity in public discourse is necessary for tolerance 
and mutual co-existence in liberal democracies.7 I return to this issue when I discuss 
political correctness and other applications in section 4. 
The preceding point calls for reasons why a person may be averse to 
insincerity or have a preference for sincerity, and why such a preference may be 
driven by instrumental or intrinsic motivations. Notice that in the above papers (e.g., 
Dufwenberg, 2002; Huang, 2003; and Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), only one 
player is guilt-averse or only one player’s guilt aversion is relevant for the analysis. 
My model could be seen as one in which both players are guilt-averse but for different 
reasons. Under this interpretation, the proposer extends insincere offers to assuage his 
guilt while the responder dislikes them because she feels guilty if she believes that she 
is forcing someone to accept her or be nice to her out of guilt. While the proposer feels 
guilty for disappointing others, the responder feels guilty if she believes that she is 
manipulating the proposer’s guilt for her personal gain. The responder does not feel 
guilty if she rejects an offer. 
People may be insincerity averse if they believe that the intention behind an 
offer or an apparent prosocial behavior is to make them feel morally obliged to 
                                                 
6 This quote and the two others at the beginning of this article are taken from 
http://www.brainyquote.com. 
7 Markovits (2006) presents a related argument. 
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reciprocate in the future or requires them to stroke their benefactor’s ego by being held 
to an emotional ransom of a perpetual demonstration of gratitude. 
Insincerity-aversion may also stem from the belief that those who act out of 
guilt are ultimately not trust-worthy.8 They can fake their behavior for only a short 
while but eventually their true feelings and behavior will come out. So the responder 
may be insincerity-averse because she wants to interact with people that she can trust. 
To avoid the cost of being unpleasantly surprised, insincerity-averse people will 
terminate cooperation sooner than later.  
Related to the previous point is the observation that the desire to know the 
sincerity of others in socio-economic relationships may stem from the fact that 
knowledge of such sincerity or the degree thereof may determine the effort that an 
insincerity-averse person puts into the relationship.9 The cost of insincerity is then the 
cost of over-investing in the relationship based on the erroneous information or 
presumption that the person being dealt with was sincere. In this regard, Hill and 
O’Hara (2007) examine how the law should intervene to either promote more accurate 
trust levels or to mitigate the costs of mistaken assessments in contractual and non-
contractual relationships.  
Ayres and Klass (2005, 2004) present a lucid and interesting examination of 
the legal implications of insincere promises and misrepresented intent. A promise is 
insincere if the promisor never intended to fulfill the promise. According to Ayres and 
Klass (2005), a promisee cares about the sincerity of the promisor because “… breach-
of-contract damages are not fully compensatory.” If such damages were fully 
                                                 
8 There is now a growing literature on trust in economics (see, for example, Laibson et al., 2000; 
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; and the references cited therein) 
9 I thank Claire Hill for this point. 
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compensatory, a promisee will not care about the sincerity of the promisor. This is 
consistent with our earlier point that a person may be insincerity-averse because  
dealing with an insincere person is costly.10 However, Hill and O’Hara (2007) observe 
that full compensation for breach-of-contract damages may lead to excessive levels of 
trust in contracting relationships. 
It is conceivable that in formal and financial matters of the kind analyzed in 
Huang (2003), a person may have an instrumental value for sincerity but in non-
financial and informal matters, the same person may be more likely to have an 
intrinsic value for sincerity. Indeed, in formal relationships protected by the law, guilt-
aversion is more likely to sustain cooperation because the law reduces the cost of 
insincerity, even if it does not eliminate it. Hence insincerity aversion will matter less 
in such relationships than in informal relationships.  
Benabou and Tirole (2006a) study a model in which prosocial behavior 
(e.g., contribution to a public good) can yield different payoffs depending on 
whether the such behavior is perceived to have been motivated by altruism (e.g., 
the donor would like to remain anonymous) or by a desire for public show or 
good public image.11 Anonymous donors may then be perceived as being more 
sincere than donors who have a strong preference to have their contributions 
publicized. In their model, a person’s reputational payoff is increasing in his 
                                                 
10 To be sure, any moral hazard behavior in a principal-agent relationship could be considered as 
insincere behavior. However, in a standard principal-agent model, the principal would not derive 
any disutility from an agent who exerts a high effort or desists from moral hazard behavior out of 
guilt. The principal only cares about actions not intentions. And if the principal cares about 
intentions, it is only in an instrumental sense insofar intentions affect actions. In contrast, my 
model is also applicable to situations where intentions have intrinsic value for people and therefore 
the same action will yield different payoffs depending on the intention behind it.   
11 On the latter motivation, see also Glazer and Konrad (1996). For an interesting and extensive survey of 
the literature on altruism and philanthropy, see Andreoni (2006). 
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intrinsic motivation as perceived by others but is decreasing in perceived extrinsic 
motivation. Insincerity-aversion by others (e.g., beneficiaries) may cause 
benefactors (donors) to contribute less because their altruism (intrinsic 
motivation) is called into question leading to a dampening effect on their  
incentive to engage in prosocial behavior.12  
 Benabou and Tirole (2006a) focus on the effect of extrinsic incentives 
(i.e., material rewards) on prosocial behavior in world where the sincerity (i.e., 
intrinsic motivation) of such behavior matters. I focus on the ability of guilt-
aversion to achieve the kind of prosocial behavior that will be accepted by the 
intended beneficiaries in a world where the sincerity of such behavior matters. My 
model applies to social interactions that involve a very small number of people 
(e.g., two people). It is in such interactions that benefactors can explicitly make 
offers to intended beneficiaries that might lead to an acceptance or rejection. On 
the other hand, the model in Benabou and Tirole (2006a) is more applicable to 
situations where insincerity-averse beneficiaries cannot reject donations (i.e., 
offers) because the donations are targeted at a large number of anonymous  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Psychologists have long argued that monetary incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation for desired 
behavior. Economists have recently begun to pay attention to this possible effect (see Frey, 1997; Benabou 
and Tirole, 2006a, and the references cited therein). 
 12
beneficiaries (e.g., donating blood).13 
Kartik and McAfee (2006) study a game of electoral competition in which 
voters have preferences over the character and campaign promises of politicians. 
If two politicians propose the same policy, voters get a higher utility from the 
candidate who is perceived to have character. This higher utility does not stem 
from a belief that the politician with character will honor his campaign promise 
while the politician without character will renege on his promise. It is simply due 
to the fact that voters directly value character per se. Hence the voters have an 
intrinsic value, as opposed to an instrumental value, for the sincerity of 
politicians. 
As a reason for why voters may have this preference, Kartik and McAfee 
(2006) argue that voters may not like politicians who are willing to pander or say 
anything in order to get votes. They like a politician who will run on a platform 
that he truly believes in and thinks is best for the country, even if that will not get 
him votes. In this sense, voters’ concern about character is similar to a concern for  
sincerity.14  
                                                 
13 There are other differences between my model and Benabou and Tirole (2006a). First, while donors in 
their model care about the opinion of others, this concern does not depend on the endogenous expected 
payoff of others. Agents engaged in prosocial behavior do not have belief-dependent preferences, so their 
model is not a psychological game. Second, in their model, an agent derives disutility from being perceived 
as motivated by extrinsic incentives even if this is not known with certainty. In my model, the proposer 
who extends an insincere offer feels guilty if and only if the responder can tell with certainty that his offer 
was insincere. Third, in my model, the responder rejects offers with positive probability. This is a 
punishment to the proposer since some sincere offers are rejected with positive probability. In contrast, all 
offers in Benabou and Tirole (2006a) are accepted but donors are punished through the expected loss of 
reputational payoff. Fourth, in my model, the disutility from insincere offers is captured in the payoff of 
the intended beneficiary, while in Benabou and Tirole (2006a), it enters the payoff of the donor. I return to 
this difference in section 4.  Fifth, Benabou and Tirole (2006a) do not focus on guilt or different 
formulations of guilt. And sixth, the choice of prosocial behavior is binary in my model, while it is 
continuous or binary in Benabou and Tirole (2006a).  
14 The voters in Kartik and McAfee (2006) have interdependent type preferences as in Gul and 
Pesendorder (2005). 
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 Sobel (1985) studies a signaling game where a receiver has an 
instrumental value for the sincerity of the sender. The sender might be a friend or 
an enemy. His model differs from the present model in the following respects: (1) 
his model is only applicable to situations in which the receiver has an 
instrumental value for sincerity, so she derives a positive utility from the sender’s 
good behavior even if such behavior is out of guilt, (2) the sender is not driven by 
guilt nor by various forms of endogenous guilt (i.e., simple guilt and guilt from 
blame), (3) the sender’s second-order beliefs do not enter his utility function, and 
(4) he discusses different applications from those in the present paper. 
 
3. A Game of Social Interaction with Guilt 
In this section, I consider a very simple model to examine the several 
examples of prosocial behavior mentioned in section 1, where the sincerity of 
actions matters. While the model is applicable to those examples, I use one 
specific example in this section for the sake of exposition. In particular, I focus on 
situations where the proposer has the option of helping the responder in an 
activity. In section 4, I demonstrate how this simple model can be adapted to the 
issue of political correctness. 
Consider two people, 1 and 2. I use male pronouns for player 1 and female 
pronouns for player 2. Player 1 has the option of proposing to help player 2 in 
some activity. Suppose that nature gives player 1 a social type which is his private 
information. If person 1 is of social type wH > 0, then he derives a psychic benefit 
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(joy) of wH from helping player 2.15 If he is of social type wL, then he incurs a 
cost of wL > 0 of helping player 2. Let the probability distribution of these types 
be such that Pr(wH) = p and Pr(wL) = 1-p, p )1,0(∈ . Furthermore, player 1 feels 
guilty, if he does not offer to help player 2. I assume that player suffers a guilt 
cost denoted by G.  
As in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005, 2006), player 1’s guilt depends on 
the extent to which he believes that he has disappointed player 2. In particular, I 
assume that G = αD2, where D2 is the disappointment felt by player 2 when player 
1 does not offer to help her. I shall endogenize D2 but it is easier to do so when 
part of the solution to the game has been discussed. This is because D2 depends on 
endogenous second-order beliefs making the game a dynamic psychological game 
(Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2005, 2006). 
An offer is insincere if it is extended by player 1 of type wL and it is 
sincere if it is extended by player 1 of type wH.  
If player 2 believes that player 1 genuinely wants her company or wants to 
help her, she gets a utility, v > 0, given that she accepted player 1’s offer. If she 
believes that player 1’s offer is insincere, she incurs a psychic cost of θ > 0, given 
that she accepted player 1’s offer.  
Let v be a random variable that is commonly known to be continuously 
distributed on ]v~,v[ with density f(v) and corresponding distribution function, 
F(v), .0v >  I assume that F(v) is a strictly increasing function. I assume that v is 
player 2’s private information but θ is common knowledge. 
                                                 
15 One could think of this as a “warm glow” of giving (Andreoni, 1990). 
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After observing his social type, player 1 has two actions: offer to help (I) 
or do not offer to help (N). Player 2 has two actions: accept (A) or reject (R) an 
offer from player 1. The game is sequential. Player 1 is the first-mover and player 
2 is the second-mover.  
Player 1’s payoff is  
(a) u1 = wH,  if he plays I, his social type is wH, and player 2 plays A 
(b) u1 = -wL,  if he plays I, his social type is wL, and player 2 plays A 
 
(c) u1= -G, if he plays N 
 
(d) u1 = 0, if he plays I and player 2 plays R 
 
Player 2’s payoff, assuming for a moment that she knows player 1’s social 
type, is 
(i) u2 = -θ, if she plays A, given that player 1 of type wL played I 
(ii) u2 = v, if she plays A, given that player 1 of type wH played I 
(iii) u2 = 0, if she plays R 
 
Player 1 need not show that his offer is out of guilt when his social type is 
wL. It is sufficient for player 2 to believe that player 1’s offer is insincere. It is 
player 2’s inference about player 1’s intentions that matters. Therefore, the same 
action (i.e., offer) by player 1 could give player 2 different payoffs depending on 
her beliefs about player 1’s intentions. Given that given v > 0, player 2 would 
accept any offer from player 1 if she did not care about player 1’s intentions. 
It is important to note that player 1 does not feel guilty so long as he offers 
to help player 2, even if he does not want player 2 to accept his offer. If his social 
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type is wL, he might offer to help player 2 and if player 2 rejects it, then he suffers 
no guilt. While the motivation for this behavior may be straightforward, it may be 
helpful to elaborate further. One explanation is that player 1 does not feel guilty 
because he can justify his behavior on the grounds that he, after all, took the risk 
of offering to help player 2.16 This is what Baumeister et al. (1994) refer to as the 
deconstruction of guilt (see example on Seinfeld episode in section 4).  
Of course, if player 2 could definitely tell that player 1 extended an 
insincere offer with the goal of getting his offer rejected, then a rejection of an 
insincere offer from player 2 could make player 1 feel guilty. 17 However, due to 
incomplete information, player 2 cannot, in general, be certain of the insincerity 
or otherwise of player 1’s offer. So due to incomplete information, the rejection of 
an insincere offer does not make player 1 feel guilty.18   
The players have common priors. All this information is common 
knowledge. In what follows, I assume that player 2 has intrinsic value for 
sincerity. Later, I shall show that the model is applicable even if player 2 has 
instrumental value for sincerity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 If player 1’s social type is wL, then offering to help player 2 is risky because she might accept 
his offer. In Benabou and Tirole (2006a) such an agent suffers some disutility even if it is not 
known with certainty that his offer was insincere. 
17 Of course, player 1’s guilt need not depend on player 2’s words or actions. This is at the heart of 
the distinction between simple guilt and guilt from blame considered in this paper. For an 
interesting discussion of the social importance of guilt, see Baumeister et al. (1994). 
18It may sometimes appear that what we refer to as guilt should actually be called shame. 
Accordingly, one may argue that what Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006) refer to as guilt from 
blame should be called shame. In order not to get bogged down by semantics, we stick to 
Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s (2006) terminology. 
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3.1 Equilibrium analysis 
I look for psychological perfect Bayesian equilibria (PPBE) of this game. 
A psychological perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PPBE) is a PBE with the 
additional requirement that players’ endogenous first-order and higher-order 
beliefs are correct in equilibrium. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006) adapt the 
sequential equilibrium solution concept of Kreps and Wilson (1982) to their 
game. However, a psychological PBE is equivalent to a psychological sequential 
equilibrium in this simple social interaction game because, as shown below, out-
of-equilibrium beliefs are either irrelevant or player 1 plays either strategy with 
positive probability in equilibrium. 
Note that if player 1 plays N, then player 2 does not have to respond. So 
player 2’s behavior is restricted to her response when player 1 plays I. For player 
1, I consider both decisions (i.e., offer to help or not offer to help).  
Let ]1,0[∈σ  be the probability that player 2 rejects an offer from player 1  
and let ]1,0[∈λ  be the probability that player 1 will offer to help player 2 when 
his social type is wL. Notice that when player 1’s social type is wH, it trivially 
follows that he will offer to help player 2 with certainty. 
Given player 1’s strategy,19 player 2 computes the posterior probabilities 
p)p1(
)p1(
)wPr()wI(
)wPr()wI(
)Iw(
H,Li
ii
LL
LL +−λ
−λ=∑ ρ
ρ=ρ≡ρ
=
      (1) 
and  
p)p1(
p)Iw( HH +−λ=ρ≡ρ .        (2) 
                                                 
19 Of course, we shall find player 1’s optimal offer probabilities. 
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Note that )Iw( Hρ > p for )1,0[∈λ . 
Player 2’s expected equilibrium payoff if she accepts an offer from player 
1 could be written as  
θρ−ρ=λ )Iw(v)Iw()(U LH2    (3) 20 
Player 2 rejects an offer, if )(U2 λ < 0. It follows that player 2 of type 
p
)p1(
)Iw(
)Iw(
)(vˆ
H
L θ−λ=ρ
θρ=λ  is indifferent between accepting or rejecting an 
offer. Therefore,   
))(vˆ(Fdv)v(f
)(vˆ
v
λ==σ ∫
λ
,       (4) 
Then it immediately follows that λ∂σ∂ /  > 0. Hence, player 2 increases her 
rejection probability, if she believes that the probability of insincere offers is 
higher. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Clearly, player 2 makes her decision based on her expected payoff. Ex post, the interaction 
between the parties, given that player 1 of type wL is helping player 2, can be described in the 
following three different ways: (a) player 1 is lukewarm but civil towards player 2 when his social 
type is wL, given that player 2 accepted his offer. Player 1 sees nothing wrong with a lukewarm 
and civil interaction, so he feels no guilt. However, player 2 suffers a disutility of θ from player 
1’s lukewarm attitude towards her, when his social type is wL and enjoys a payoff of v from player 
1’s warm attitude when his social type is wH. Then consistent with our analysis player 2’s 
expected payoff, when she accepts an offer, is the expression in equation (3); (b) having extended 
an insincere offer (i.e., his social type is wL), player 1 pretends that he enjoys helping player 2 
given that player 2 has accepted his offer. Player 2, having accepted an offer, is aware of this 
potential pretence, but enjoys the interaction based on the fact that the expected benefits are not 
smaller than the expected costs. Obviously, this is the case when the expected payoff in equation 
(3) is non-negative and this is indeed her expected payoff, ex post; and (c) having accepted an 
offer, player 2 is able to convince herself that player 1 genuinely enjoys helping her company, 
even if player 1 is actually pretending. However, this does not change her ex ante decision rule by 
causing her to necessarily accept every offer. This is because her present self (pre-acceptance self) 
is not able to anticipate the behavior of her future self (post-acceptance self). This is similar to the 
behavior of naïve types (naifs) in Rabin and O’Donoghue (1999).  
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3.1.1 Simple guilt 
I now endogenize player 2’s level of disappointment. As in Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2006), player 2’s disappointment is a function of the difference 
between her expected payoff and her actual payoff.  
Let 1λ  be player 2’s first-order belief of λ and player 1’s belief (second-
order) of 1λ  be 2λ .21  
If player 2 does not get an offer from player 1, her actual payoff is zero. If 
she gets an offer and she accepts it, then she expects a payoff of )(U 12 λ  > 0. So if 
she plans on accepting an offer, then her disappointment, given that she did not 
get an offer, is )(U 12 λ – 0 > 0. On the other hand, if she rejects an offer, she must 
believe that her payoff if she had accepted it would have been )(U 12 λ  < 0. So in 
this case, her disappointment from a non-offer is )(U 12 λ  – 0 < 0. So she actually 
suffers no disappointment from not getting an offer.  
Based on the above discussion, we may write player 2’s disappointment as  
D2( 1λ , v, θ) = max [ )(U 12 λ - 0, 0]      (5) 
Player 1 needs to determine his optimal offer probability, λ. But to do so 
he has to form beliefs about 1λ since D2( 1λ , v, θ)  is a function of 1λ . Hence 
player 1’s optimal choice of λ depends on his second-order beliefs (i.e., λ2) of λ 
and thus on player 2’s expectation of the equilibrium play of the game. Player 1’s 
payoff does not only depend on player 2’s actions but also depends on his 
endogenous beliefs of player 2’s beliefs. Indeed, since ρH ≡ )Iw( Hρ is a function 
                                                 
21 As in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006), we consider beliefs, at most, of the fourth order. 
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of λ, it follows that player 1’s payoff depends on his beliefs of player 2’s updated 
beliefs of his social type. Therefore, we may write player 1’s cost of guilt as  
G = αD2(ρH( 2λ ), v, θ). I abuse notation by rewriting player 1’s cost of guilt as 
G = αD2( 2λ , v, θ),       (6) 
where α is common knowledge and measures player 1’s sensitivity to guilt. The 
formulation in (6) makes this game a psychological game in the sense of Battigalli 
and Dufwenberg (2005, 2006), where player 1 has belief-dependent preferences 
about player 2’s belief about his social type. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006) 
refer to the formulation of guilt in (6) as simple guilt.  
It is important to reiterate that player 1 might feel guilty if and only if he 
does not offer to help player 2, and does not feel guilty if player 2 rejects his 
offer. Indeed, as argued above, player 2 feels no disappointment if she rejects 
player 1’s offer. Therefore, the formulation of guilt based on equation (6) is 
consistent with Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s (2006, note 3) argument that a player 
“… cannot be guilty for others’ behavior.” So if player 2 rejects player 1’s offer, 
player 1 cannot assume any responsibility for player 2’s reluctance to accept his 
offer. 
Since player 1 knows θ and knows the distribution of v, he uses the 
expected value of v (i.e., v ) in his decision making. That is, he assumes that 
player 2’s disappointment from a non-offer is D2 = max[ θρ−−ρ )1(v HH , 0], 
where θρ−−ρ )1(v HH = )v(dF)(Uv~v 2 ⋅∫ .  
I characterize the equilibria of this game under the following three 
exhaustive cases: (a) σ < 1- G/wL, (b) σ = 1- G/wL, and (c) σ > 1- G/wL.  
 21
 
Case (a): σ < 1- G/wL 
Suppose λ1 = 2λ = 0. Then player 2 believes that player 1 will not offer to 
help her when his social type is wL. And also player 1 believes that player 2 
believes that player 1 will not offer to help her when his social type is wL. 
Suppose also that (1-σ)wL > α{max[ θρ−−ρ )1(v HH , 0]}= α( θρ−−ρ )1(v HH ) > 
0. Then player 1’s optimal response is λ= 0. Note that  
(1-σ)wL > α( θρ−−ρ )1(v HH ) = G > 0 holds if v  is sufficiently low and/or θ is 
sufficiently high and/or α is sufficiently low. This gives the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: If player 1 suffers from simple guilt, and (a) player 2 does not 
expect any insincere offers, (b) player 1 believes that player 2 does not expect any 
insincere offers, (c) player 2 has a sufficiently low valuation for sincere offers, 
and/or a sufficiently high disutility for insincere offers and/or player 1 has a 
sufficiently low sensitivity to guilt, then there exists a psychological PBE in the 
social interaction game where all offers are sincere and player 2 accepts all 
offers.22 
 
Case (b): σ = 1- G/wL 
Now consider some 2λ ∈  (0, 1) . Then player 1 believes that player 2 
believes that player 1 will offer to help her with probability 2λ ∈  (0, 1) when his 
                                                 
22 In proving this proposition, I assumed that θρ−−ρ )H1(vH > 0. This proposition also holds if 
θρ−−ρ )H1(vH  ≤ 0 which gives G = αD2 = 0. 
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social type is wL. Suppose also that θρ−−ρ )1(v HH  > 0, given 2λ . Then player 
1 believes that player 2 will suffer a disappointment of  
D2 = max [ θρ−−ρ )1(v HH  - 0, 0] = θρ−−ρ )1(v HH  > 0, if he does not offer to 
help her. Then G(λ) = α( θρ−−ρ )1(v HH ) > 0. Therefore, given that player 1 is of  
social type wL, he is indifferent between extending an offer and not doing so if 
 –(1 – σ)wL = – α( θρ−−ρ )1(v HH ). This gives σ = 1 – α( θρ−−ρ )1(v HH )/wL.  
It follows from (4) that that ))(vˆ(F λ  = σ = 1 – G(λ)/wL. The solution to 
this equation gives *λ . Assume that *λ ∈  (0, 1). Imposing consistency of beliefs 
gives 1λ = *2 λ=λ . This gives the following proposition: 
Proposition 2:  If player 1 suffers from simple guilt, then there exists a 
psychological PBE in which player 1 offers to help player 2 if  his  social type is  
wH. If his social type is wL and σ* =1 - g/wL, then he offers to help player 2 with 
probability *λ ∈(0, 1). Player 2 rejects player 1’s offer with probability σ*, where  
player 2 of type v ≤ )(vˆ *λ rejects offers, and player 2 of type v > )(vˆ *λ  accepts 
offers. 
 
Case (c): σ > 1- G/wL 
Now suppose that 1λ = *2 λ=λ = 1. Also, assume that  –(1 – σ)wL > – 
α(ρH v – (1- ρH)θ) , where ρH = p and ρH v – (1- ρH)θ > 0. Then the following 
proposition holds: 
Proposition 3: If player 1 suffers from simple guilt, then there exists a 
psychological PBE in which player 1 always offers to help  player 2  and player 2 
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rejects player 1’s offer with probability σ** = ))1(vˆ(F > 1 – g/wL > 0, where  
player 2 of type v ≤ )1(vˆ  rejects offers, and player 2 of type v > )1(vˆ accepts 
offers. 
Note from (2) that ρH is decreasing in λ. So comparing proposition 1 
where 1λ = *2 λ=λ = 0 with propositions 2 and 3, where both players believe that 
an insincere offer will be extended with some positive probability, it follows that 
H
~ρ > Hρˆ , where H~ρ  is player 2’s belief that player 1 is of social type wH in 
proposition 1 and is also player 1’s belief of player 2’s belief. Hρˆ  is similarly 
defined for propositions 2 and 3.  
For proposition 1 to hold, we required (1-σ)wL > α( θρ−−ρ )~1(v~ HH )) . For 
propositions 2 and 3, we required (1-σ)wL ≤ α( θρ−−ρ )ˆ1(vˆ HH ) . Note that 
θρ−−ρ )~1(v~ HH  > θρ−−ρ )ˆ1(vˆ HH  since H~ρ > Hρˆ . It follows that if (1-σ)wL > 
α( θρ−−ρ )~1(v~ HH ) holds, then (1-σ)wL ≤ α( θρ−−ρ )ˆ1(vˆ HH ) cannot hold and vice 
versa. An implication is that the equilibria above are unique given the specified  
conditions.23 It also gives the following corollary: 
Corollary 1: If players 1 and 2 hold beliefs that generate the equilibrium with 
only sincere offers, then there exists no beliefs that can generate an equilibrium 
with insincere offers. Conversely, if they hold beliefs that generate an equilibrium 
with insincere offers, then there exists no beliefs that can generate an equilibrium 
with only sincere offers. 
                                                 
23 Note that if σ > 1- G/wL, then λ = 1 is player 1’s unique response. If σ < 1- G/wL, then λ = 0 is 
his unique response. Since ))(vˆ(F λ is monotonic in λ, it follows that σ = ))(vˆ(F λ is unique given that 
λ is unique. Suppose that when σ = 1- G/wL, player 1’s optimal λ in the mixed strategy is unique. 
Then σ is also unique. 
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Note that we do not have to worry about out-of-equilibrium beliefs in any 
of the equilibria above. Suppose that in proposition 3, player 2 observed an out-
of-equilibrium action of N by player 1. Then the game ends, so player 2’s beliefs 
are irrelevant. In propositions 1 and 2 player 1 plays either N or I with positive 
probability, so player 2 will continue to update her beliefs using Bayes’ rule.  
It is straightforward to apply the model to a situation in which player 2 has 
an instrumental value for sincerity. Imagine that accepting player 1’s offer 
requires an investment, e, by player 2 into an activity, which yields a net benefit 
of ve if player 1 is sincere and cost of θe if player 1 is insincere. This cost may be 
incurred because player 1 of type wL does not put enough effort into the activity. 
However, player 2 will not suffer this cost if player 1 exerts the required effort, 
regardless of whether he did so out of guilt or wholeheartedly. The cost of effort 
to player 2 is C(e) which is an increasing and strictly convex function. Then 
player 2’s expected payoff is U2(e, λ1) = [ρHv – (1- ρH)θ]e – C(e). It immediately 
follows that e*(λ1) = argmax U2(e, λ1) = ))1(v(C HH
1 θρ−−ρ′− . The inverse of 
)e(C′ exists because it is a monotonic function. Clearly, e* is decreasing in λ1 and 
by the envelope theorem, U2(e*(λ1), λ1) is also decreasing in λ1. Then  
D2 = max[U2(e*(λ1), λ1) – 0, 0] is also decreasing in λ1 for U2(e*(λ1), λ1) > 0.24 
 Player 1 of type wL extends an offer hoping that player 2 will reject it. In 
doing so, he compares (1 – σ)wL to G = αD2. But if player 2 accepts the offer, 
then ex post, player 1 of type wL will not invest in the activity (i.e., renege on his 
offer to help) if wL > G. This latter condition is consistent with (1 – σ)wL > G and 
                                                 
24 Of course, player 2 will set e* > 0 if and only if U2(e*, λ1) > 0. Otherwise, she will set e* = 0. 
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(1 – σ)wL ≤ G. By imposing the restriction wL > G, player 1 of social type wL will 
always be insincere ex post (i.e., after his offer has been accepted). Hence whether 
player 2 has an intrinsic or instrumental value for sincerity makes no difference to 
the analysis. Therefore all the above propositions continue to hold. 
 
3.1.2 Guilt from blame  
In the simple guilt formulation of Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006), a 
player feels guilty as a result of the disappointment felt by others, even if the 
affected people do not blame him for his actions. Battigalli and Dufwenberg 
(2006) also consider another formulation of guilt, where a player who has 
disappointed another player feels guilty depending on the extent to which the 
affected player blames him for his actions. They refer to this as guilt from blame.  
One can interpret simple guilt as the guilt felt from blaming one’s own self 
and guilt from blame as the guilt felt from being blamed by others. In the analysis 
below and in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006), it is implicitly assumed that for 
the same level of disappointment incurred by player 2, player 1’s guilt sensitivity 
(i.e., α) is the same whether he blames himself or he is blamed by player 2. This 
may not be the case in practice, although it seems to be the correct 
methodological assumption to make. In that way, differences in equilibrium 
behavior from these formulations of guilt will only be attributed to the differences 
in the strategic incentives that they induce as opposed to differences in a player’s 
distaste for feelings of guilt. 
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Note that there can be no guilt from blame when player 1 offers to help 
player 2 or when player 2 rejects player 1’s offer. So guilt from blame is only 
possible when player 1 does not offer to help player 2.  
In what follows, odd-numbered-order beliefs apply to player 2 and even-
numbered-order beliefs apply to player 1. Following Battigalli and Dufwenberg 
(2006), player 2’s blame of player 1 depends on her inference of the extent to 
which player 1 is willing to disappoint her. But this inference must depend on her 
beliefs of player 1’s second-order beliefs, λ2. This is player 2’s third-order belief, 
λ3. This is because her inference of the extent to which player 1 is willing to 
disappoint her depends on her beliefs of player 1’s beliefs of her expected payoff 
from accepting an offer. But for player 1 to know the blame that player 2 will 
apportion to him, he must have beliefs about λ3. This is his fourth-order belief, λ4. 
However, in our model, the case of guilt from blame turns out to be much 
easier to analyze. To this see this, observe that player 1 feels no guilt if he does 
not offer to help player 2 because player 2 will not blame him for doing so. Player 
2 understands that if player 1 does not offer to help her, then it must be the case 
that his social type is wL. And since player 2 dislikes insincere offers, she does not 
get disappointed and so does not blame player 1.25 So under guilt from blame, 
player 1 will not extend insincere offers. Consistency of beliefs requires λj = 0 for 
j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Clearly, propositions 2 and 3 are not possible under guilt from 
blame. The proposition below then follows: 
                                                 
25 She does not infer that player 1 wants to disappoint her. Her inference is that player 1 is not extending 
her an offer because player 1 knows that she does not like insincere offers. 
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Proposition 4: If player 1 suffers from guilt from blame, then there is a unique 
psychological PBE in which all offers are sincere and no offers are rejected.  
Suppose blaming a person for being antisocial can over time change their 
preferences to prosocial preferences. This is how people are sometimes socialized 
to imbibe good values or norms. Then one may argue that player 2 may still 
blame player 1 for not extending an offer even if she knows that player 1’s social 
type is wL. Player 2 may do this with the goal of changing player 1’s social type 
from wL to wH. In a multi-period model, this could result in an insincere offer in 
the current period, but sincere offers in all subsequent periods because player 1 
would have been permanently socialized as a prosocial type. However, if player 2 
has a sufficiently small discount factor, then the cost of an insincere offer in the 
current period will outweigh the discounted value of future sincere offers. Hence, 
she may not blame player 1 of type wL if he does not extend an offer. Therefore, 
proposition 4 will remain unchanged. Furthermore, every society has a positive 
proportion of antisocial types regardless of how hard it tries to inculcate prosocial 
values in its members. Besides, to argue that blaming player 1 can change his 
social type is tantamount to endogenizing preferences which is clearly beyond the 
scope of the present paper.26  
Unlike guilt from blame, player 1 blames himself under simple guilt for 
not offering to help player 2, even if his social type is wL. This makes sense 
because it is not uncommon for people to feel guilty or blame themselves for 
having certain antisocial preferences or for being of an antisocial type, even if 
they do not change your preferences. 
                                                 
26 For a recent attempt to endogenize preferences, see Akerlof and Kranton (2005). 
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4. Discussion and Applications 
Let me begin this section by noting that the story could be told differently but 
with similar results. In particular, the timing of actions could be reversed where player 2 
is the first mover and player 1 is the second mover. In this case, player 2 initiates a 
request by asking player 1 for help (H) or makes no such request (NH). Player 1’s 
response to a request for help is yes (Y) or no (N). Player 1 does not feel guilty if player 2 
does not ask for help and he does not offer to help. Then λ is now the probability that 
player 1 of type wL plays Y and σ is the probability that player 2 will play NH. This 
formulation is identical to the original formulation except that player 1’s conjecture about 
the probability that player 1 will accept his offer is 1, given that player 2 will only ask for 
help if she intends to accept player 1’s offer (i.e., if player 1 plays Y). So player 1 of type 
wL compares wL to G. 
Casual empiricism confirms a result akin to propositions 2 and 3. That is, we 
sometimes do not ask people for favors because we feel that we may be bothering them 
and therefore they may help us grudgingly out of guilt. So player 2 plays NH with 
positive probability which is equivalent to playing R with positive probability in 
propositions 2 and 3. 
Suppose player 1 feels guilty if he does not offer to help, although player 2 has 
made no request. Indeed, playing NH is a signal from player 2 to player 1 that she 
believes, with a sufficiently high probability, that his social type is wL. Then knowing 
that player 2 will reject his offer, player 1 will make an offer precisely for this reason and 
thereby assuage his guilt. In this case, player 1’s offer is akin to a costless action in a 
cheap-talk game. This also accords with casual empiricism where we sometimes make 
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offers to people who we know will not accept our offer and we, indeed, do not want them 
to accept our offer. 27  
In what follows and without loss of generality, I stick to the original formulation 
of the game where player 1 is the first mover. 
Proposition 1 is interesting because it shows that even if player 2 is 
suspicious of player 1’s intentions, there are beliefs which can sustain an 
equilibrium where mutually beneficial trades are never rejected. When player 1’s 
social type is wH, he derives satisfaction from helping player 2 and player 2 also 
derives a benefit from receiving this help. If player 2 rejects his offers in this case 
due to incomplete information, then there are clearly gains from trade that are not 
realized. Proposition 1 shows that this inefficient outcome can be precluded given 
the appropriate beliefs, even though player 2 has incomplete information. This 
clearly has implications for the ability of people to genuinely communicate their 
altruistic intentions to others. 
But proposition 4 relative to the propositions under simple guilt is even 
more interesting. Unlike simple guilt, proposition 4 shows that under guilt from 
blame, there cannot be equilibria with insincere offers. This accords with intuition 
because if player 2 is averse to insincerity and if player 1 is sensitive to blame 
from player 2, then player 2 will place the minimal blame possible on player 1 
                                                 
27 A clear example of this was the April 4, 1991 episode of Seinfeld titled “The Apartment”. Mrs. 
Hudwalker, a tenant in one of the apartments where Jerry is also a tenant, dies and Jerry proposes to Elaine 
to take the newly vacant and very cheap apartment just above his own. Later, he realized that it was a big 
mistake after talking to George. He now wanted to withdraw the proposal but could not because he will feel 
guilty. However, someone offers the superintendent $10000 per month for the apartment. Jerry then 
insincerely encourages Elaine to take the apartment although he knew that Elaine could not afford to pay 
such a huge monthly rent and would therefore reject his proposal. He is able to assuage or deconstruct his 
guilt by telling himself that Elaine would never know that he (Jerry) did not want her to have the apartment 
after the original proposal. To the extent that TV shows are reflections of parts of our real lives, this 
Seinfeld episode clearly shows how people make insincere offers to assuage their guilt. 
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mindful of the fact that it is player 1’s guilt aversion which causes him to extend 
insincere offers. With such minimal blame, player 1 has no incentive to extend 
insincere offers in order to assuage his guilt. On the other hand, if player 2’s 
blame has no effect on player 1’s guilt (i.e., simple guilt), then player 2 cannot 
guarantee sincerity. 
Notice that player 1 offers to help player 2 if he believes that player 2 
expects an offer and will be sufficiently disappointed otherwise. That is, player 1 
offers to help player 2 if he believes that player 2 expects an offer and  
ρH v  – (1- ρH)θ > 0 is sufficiently high. This accords very well with casual 
empiricism. The emotional cost (i.e., guilt) of disappointing someone coupled 
with that person’s expectations could force us to be kind to them, although we 
would have preferred to act otherwise.  
The preceding observation applies generally to the way we tolerate others 
who we would otherwise not have tolerated. In some cases, we do so only because 
such people expect to be treated with respect.  
Except for the equilibria in propositions 1 and 4, all other equilibria 
involve some insincere offers due to player 1’s guilt aversion. One may then 
conclude that guilt breeds insincerity. While this is sometimes true, proposition 1, 
for example, suggests that this is not always the case. In addition to guilt aversion, 
the players’ expectations or beliefs play a crucial role in generating an equilibrium 
with insincere or sincere offers. If player 2 expects insincere offers and player 1 
believes that player 2 expects an insincere offer, then these beliefs coupled with a 
high guilt sensitivity (i.e., high α) may indeed lead to an equilibrium with 
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insincere offers. On the other hand, if player 2 expects sincere offers and player 1 
believes that player 2 expects sincere offers, then these beliefs coupled low guilt 
sensitivity (i.e., low α) yield an equilibrium with only sincere offers. This is the 
message behind corollary 1. 
But even if guilt aversion breeds insincerity, is that necessarily a bad 
thing? Not really. As Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) demonstrate, guilt 
aversion and verbal promises can create commitment power which may foster 
trust and cooperation.  A similar point is made in Huang (2003). However, in our 
model, guilt aversion need not sustain cooperation or good behavior because 
player 2 may perceive player 1 as cooperating reluctantly or cooperating out of 
guilt. Therefore, the issue may not be whether guilt aversion leads to insincerity 
but whether the insincerity per se has an adverse effect on the utility of other 
relevant players.   
As argued in the section 2, insincerity-induced disutility is less likely in 
financial matters of the kind analyzed in Huang (2003). However, it may still 
matter in different ways. To see this, note that in my model, the disutility from 
insincere offers is captured in the payoff of the intended beneficiary, while in 
Benabou and Tirole (2006a), it enters the payoff of the donor (benefactor).  All 
donations in Benabou and Tirole (2006a) are accepted. Hence one can think of the 
model in Benabou and Tirole (2006a) as one in which  insincerity-averse 
beneficiaries do not have the option of rejecting donations or choose not to reject 
donations but treat insincere benefactors with contempt. So the fact that insincere 
offers may not be rejected does not mean that it does not matter in the sense of 
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either reducing the benefactor’s payoff as in Benabou and Tirole (2006a) or 
reducing the intended beneficiaries’ payoffs as in the present model. 
Still on the issue of insincerity, Loury (1994, p. 435) defines a regime of 
political correctness as “… an equilibrium pattern of expression and inference 
within a given community where receivers impute undesirable qualities to senders 
who express themselves in an “incorrect” way and, as a result, senders avoid such 
expressions.”28  
One can adapt this simple model to political correctness as follows: When 
player 1’s social type is wH, he gets a benefit of wH from using politically-correct 
language (e.g., affirmative action is a good policy). When his social type is wL, he 
prefers to use politically-incorrect language and therefore using politically-correct 
language imposes a cost of wL on him. This cost may stem from the mental and 
emotional effort required to restrain his language or suppress his true opinion. 
However, there is a cost of using politically-incorrect language which depends on 
social norms of appropriate language or the expectations of one’s peers. This is 
the cost of guilt in the model. Player 2 derives a benefit of v when player 1’s use 
of politically correct language is sincere, and a cost of θ, if it is insincere. When 
player 1 uses politically-correct language, player 2’s options are to either treat 
him with admiration (accept) or treat him with contempt (reject). If player 1 uses 
politically-incorrect language, then player 2’s payoff is zero. She derives no 
disutility from politically-incorrect language, so long as it is sincere. An example 
                                                 
28 As noted earlier, the sincerity of language has occupied the interest of philosophers beginning with the 
influential work of Searle (1969) and recently by Ridge (2006). 
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of such politically-incorrect language may be a member of a majority group who 
argues that most minorities at elite institutions would not have been there in the  
absence of affirmative action.29 
In a politically-correct equilibrium, wL types mimick (pool with) wH types 
as in propositions 2 and 3. And in a separating equilibrium they deviate from the 
politically-correct equilibrium if wL is sufficiently high as in proposition 1 (i.e., 
(1-σ)wL > G).30 In the latter case, all equilibrium politically-correct language is 
sincere and in the former case, some politically-correct language is insincere. 
Political correctness may have the disadvantage that people are more 
likely to be suspicious of each other’s intentions and hence a decrease in social 
interactions akin to the positive probability of rejections as in the equilibria in 
propositions 2 and 3.  
Again an insincere behavior such as political correctness need not be a bad 
thing even if it causes people to be suspicious of the intentions of others. One 
thing missing from the model is that player 2 does not derive any disutility from 
not receiving an offer (i.e., a disutility from being rejected). If she did, then we 
could argue that she derives utility from an offer even if she intends to reject the 
offer. Therefore, political correctness need not be a bad thing if people derive 
utility from politically correct language per se. For example, people derive utility 
from others restraining their use of racist, anti-semitic, sexist, and homophobic 
                                                 
29 The point is not that people do not find such language offensive. There are definitely people who do. My 
focus is on those who do not find such language offensive, so long as it is sincere. Morris (2001) presents a 
more elaborate but different model of political correctness. Morris’ (2001) model is a cheap talk game 
because the actions of the proposer (advisor in his model) do not directly affect any player’s payoffs. It 
only indirectly affects payoffs through its effect on the responder’s (decision-maker) beliefs. In the present 
model, an action by the proposer could impose a direct cost of wL or G on him.  
30Bernheim (1994) finds that people with sufficiently extreme preferences will deviate from social 
norms.    
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language, even if they know that these people harbor such thoughts. Indeed, Fish 
(1994) argues that some restriction on free speech is desirable for precisely this 
reason. However, if people do not value political correctness (i.e.,  
insincerity) per se, then it could be welfare reducing as in the present model. 31   
To be sure, there are certain situations in which people prefer insincerity:  
θ < 0 (e.g., they want their peers to not use racial slurs and instead use politically 
correct language). However, these same people may dislike insincerity in other 
situations:  θ > 0 (e.g., don’t support affirmative action or don’t offer to help me if 
your offer/support is insincere). As noted in section 2, such people may be called 
sincerity pragmatists. 
Indeed, as noted in the introduction and subsequently in the conclusion, 
Kang (2003a, 2003b) and Shklar (1984) forcefully argue that insincerity is 
necessary for mutually peaceful co-existence in a democracy. Markovitz (2006) 
takes the view that because people can have multiple intentions, listeners may 
interpret sincere statements differently, and people may say things different from 
what they intended to say, the quest for sincerity in a democracy has to be 
tampered with caution. 
                                                 
31In a related but different context, Morris (2001) finds that political correctness could lead to the 
suppression of socially valuable information. For example, a policy advisor who does not want to 
be perceived as racist may recommend an affirmative action policy when in fact he believes that 
affirmative action is a bad policy. This is similar to Kuran (1993) who argues that sincere political 
discourse leads to the exchange of valuable information and thus better social decisions. This 
argument is correct insofar as we limit ourselves to the kind of language or communication that 
results in socially valuable information. Certainly, politically incorrect language like racial slurs 
and sexist language do not achieve this goal and the argument by Kuran (1993) and Morris (2001) 
is therefore different from the argument in this paper.  
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In relationships which require short-term investments by both parties, guilt 
aversion is more likely to support co-operation because an insincerity-averse 
person might believe that that a guilt-averse person could be of good behavior for 
a short period. However, if the relationship requires long-term investment, then an 
insincerity-averse person would not believe that a guilt-averse can sustain his 
good behavior, so guilt-aversion is less likely to sustain co-operation. In this case, 
the insincerity-averse person has an instrumental value for sincerity (see Sobel, 
1985).  
On the preceding point, whether a person accepts a potentially insincere 
offer depends on the costs of insincerity (i.e., the value of θ). However, there are 
some people who will accept insincere offers because forcing people to be nice to 
them out of guilt gives them a sense of power (i.e., θ < 0). In a different but 
related context, imagine an affirmative action law that requires certain minorities 
to be employed at a public institution. A member of a minority group may feel 
empowered by working at this place, even if her superiors hired her reluctantly 
and therefore do not want her there. But whether such a minority decides to work 
in such an environment depends on her belief in the legal system to protect her 
from unfair treatment while there. Hence the expected cost of insincerity will 
influence her choice. This is related to Ayres and Klass (2005) point that a 
promisee will not care about the sincerity of a promisor, if legal damages are fully 
compensatory in the event of a breach of contract. 
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that player 2 rejects offers when θ is 
sufficiently high. A very high θ may be the characteristic of a person with a very 
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high sense of identity or self-image,32 which is consistent with why she may 
derive a high disutility from associating with people who really don’t like her. 
Associating with people who pretend to like her imposes a cost on her similar to 
the cost stemming from a loss of identity in Akerlof and Kranton (2000).33 If so, 
the rejection of player1’s offer when θ is very high may be player 2’s way of 
choosing her identity by choosing who to associate with in the sense of Akerlof 
and Kranton (2000). Consistent with Akerlof and Kranton (2000), my model will 
predict that women may reject attempts to entice them to traditionally male 
professions, if they believe that they will only be tolerated but not truly 
accepted.34 A difference between my explanation and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 
is that identity is an observable characteristic while intention is not. Intention can 
be inferred but not necessarily observed. 
The analysis has been based on the assumption that player 1 incurs no cost 
if his offer is rejected. It is conceivable that if and only if his social type is wH, he 
might find a rejection embarrassing.35 The absence of this cost explains why if 
player 1’s social type is wH, he always offers to help player 2. However, we 
sometimes do not invite certain people into closer relationships (e.g., offer to help 
them) not because we do not like them. On the contrary, we like them but we are 
not sure if it is appropriate to offer to help them. By keeping the relationship at 
                                                 
32 Conditional on knowing the insincerity of an offer, a person who rejects such offers may have a 
very high self esteem. But without knowing for sure whether an offer is insincere, a high rejection 
rate may be the characteristic of a person with low self esteem who is paranoid about insincerity 
and therefore may think that most offers are insincere when this is not actually the case. For a 
discussion of the self see Baumeister (1998). 
33 For other recent economic models of identity, see Darity, Mason, and Stewart (2006) and 
Benabou and Tirole (2006b). 
34 On a related point, see Case (2003). 
35 Of course, he does not suffer this cost if his social type is wL, since he wants his offer to be 
rejected in this case anyway. 
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the original lower level, we do not rock the boat. Indeed, a rejection can even 
push the relationship to a much lower level.  
Including the cost of rejection or embarrassment to player 1 will not alter 
our results. Note that including the cost of rejection to player 1 will induce player 
2 to moderate her rejection rate in order to encourage player 1 to extend an offer if 
his social type is wH but it will not affect the qualitative results in the paper. 
Suppose k > 0 is the cost of rejection or embarrassment to player 1 when his 
social type is wH. Then he extend an offer if (1-σ)wH - σk > -G. This holds if k is 
sufficiently small. Indeed, in propositions 1 and 4 there is no rejection of offers in 
equilibrium, so the cost of rejection will have no effect. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have presented an analysis of a common social phenomenon. Using a 
very simple model, I depart from previous analysis of guilt aversion by taking into 
account insincerity-induced disutility stemming from guilt aversion. Insincerity-
aversion affects trust in relationships, cooperative behavior, and leads to 
deadweight losses (i.e., mutually beneficial trades may not be realized).  
However, due to incomplete information, guilt aversion still results in 
some cooperation, even if people are averse to insincerity. Clearly, the 
responder’s acceptance probability is not zero, if the cost of insincerity, θ, is 
sufficiently small. But more importantly, the beliefs held by the players can lead 
to an equilibrium in which no mutually beneficial trades are rejected. And 
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whether this result occurs with certainty depends on the nature of guilt (i.e., 
simple guilt versus guilt from blame). 
To quote Shklar (1984, p. 77), “[T]he democracy of everyday life, which 
is rightly admired by egalitarian visitors to America, does not arise from 
sincerity…. Not all of us are even convinced that all men are entitled to a certain 
minimum respect. Only some of us think so. But most of us always act as if we 
really did believe it, and that is what counts.” However, as the analysis in this 
paper points out people, driven by guilt, may choose to be insincere when 
sincerity need not disturb mutually peaceful co-existence. On the other hand, 
sincerity pragmatists may be insincerity-averse in certain situations but not in 
others. The ‘truth’ hurts but not always.  
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